Democrazy - Deficit I

In this part, we analyze the electoral mechanism of Germany and why it is unsuitable for determining the will of the people.

There is a democratic deficit because the german electoral mechanism is unsuitable for determining the will of the people as a whole.

The strongest argument for my assessment that our electoral mechanism implies a democratic deficit is that the election of the “Bundestag” (legislator) is reduced to a battle for the best interest. In this context, “best interest” means the one that attracts the most votes. For the sake of clarity, I offer a fictitious example that takes place before the 2021 federal election:

1. Problem - Introduction

Voter Max Mustermann goes to work. His wage is low compared to the average German wage. That alone does not make him a person without prospects, but, admittedly, he does not exactly have many opportunities. As a result, he feels politically and socially abandoned. That's why he would prefer to vote for Die Linke, which stands for the fight against the low-wage sector and for social justice. However, the SPD has also made it clear that it wants a certain minimum wage.

Max Mustermann lives in a rural area. He therefore has to use his car to get to work. The car was given to him by his parents. He wouldn't have been able to afford it on his salary. As fuel is (still) far cheaper than buying a bus ticket every day, he naturally prefers to drive for economic reasons. It also saves him a lot of time. A train wouldn't even run. So he doesn't like the way Die Linke is taking action against cars, especially diesel-powered motorized cars. He is much more likely to find his political will with the FDP, AfD or the CDU/CSU. The Greens don't go there neither.

But Max Mustermann is a criminal. At the end of his busy week, usually on Friday evenings, he meets up with friends at home. There they talk excitedly and sometimes politically about the week's events. “The boss sucks”, this and that. And they consume a hash cigarette, also known as a joint. His experiences with it are mostly positive. First and foremost, getting out of bed the next morning without any problems and, above all, without a hangover. He is therefore firmly convinced that cannabis should be legalized. This preference brings Max Mustermann back to the Left Party. But the FDP, the Greens and the SPD also favour legalization.

However, there is another request. There is a so-called Asylum accommodation in Max Mustermann's rural region. So far, there have been no problems. Although the media repeatedly reported incidents in connection with people seeking protection, for Max Mustermann these were isolated cases that did not represent everyone. Like all the other inhabitants of his village, he greeted people seeking protection who passed by nicely and with a “Hello, how are you?”. But one day, an incident occurred. His neighbor's sister was raped by several residents of the Asylum accommodation. In the end, it turned out that one of them had already committed several crimes and should not have been granted Asylum in the first place. The only option for Max Mustermann in this matter ist the political path of the AfD. Of course not all people seeking protection are criminals, he thinks to himself, but black sheep do exist nonetheless and this requires a political solution.

And now Max Mustermann is standing in front of the polling station. Who is he going to vote for?

This fictitious voter is neither an average nor a special exception. But what this short story should emphasize:

A voter has many interests.

There are voter interests that are answered politically.

There are voter interests that are not answered politically.

In the fictitious example, it becomes clear that there is not a single party that answers each of Max M.'s interests to his satisfaction. In the latter case, he cannot even find a party to vote for. And so the battle for the best interest begins. In the end, Max M. opts for the party that satisfies his “most important” interest.

A further democratic deficit as a result of the electoral mechanism arises in the case of interests that receive broad support in isolation. It is possible that there are issues that are resolved similarly by a majority of the parties. However, due to the different parties, they are not capable of achieving a majority in practice. Another fictitious example: There is an interest X that receives >70% support. Four parties pursue interest X. However, because two parties in the government are not pursuing issue X, it is not introduced by the governing coalition. This means that 11.5 % + 14.8 %, i.e. 26.3 %, prevent X from being implemented for reasons that can only be seen in realpolitik; an interest with broad support does not make it into the decision-making spaces. The same situation is possible with the opposite sign. There may be an interest that is strongly in the minority and only achieves 5.1 % in the election. However, because a coalition is formed between two moderately strong parties (25% and 20%) and this weak party (5.1%), it is possible that in the end an interest is pushed through that was only legitimized by 5.1% of voters.

Ultimately, these statements can be reduced to a few sentences:

The voter has certain interests. A party has specific interests. These are two different things. In order to politically legitimize an interest, the voter must vote for the party that supports that very interest of the citizen. This means that it always takes a detour via the party to reach the interest, which means that deficits are inevitable as these interests are not congruent. This has developed into a battle for the best interest. For me, this is a deficit that needs to be remedied. As it ultimately weakens our democracy. It leads to the (arbitrary) rule of the majority over the minority.